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There are a variety of reasons why a government supervisor might
wish to search a government employee's workplace. For example, a
supervisor might wish to conduct a search to locate a needed file or
document; a supervisor might wish to search an employee's workplace to
discover whether the employee is misusing government property, such as a
government-owned computer; or a supervisor might seek to search an
employee's workplace because he has information that the employee is
committing a crime, such as using the Internet to download child
pornography.
In situations where a public employer wants to search an employee's
office or desk, a number of questions typically arise and must be addressed,
including: can government employees have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their offices, desks, computers, and filing cabinets? If such an
expectation of privacy does exist, what standards must a supervisor follow
to lawfully conduct a warrantless search of those areas? Must a supervisor
have probable cause to search a government employee's workplace? Or is
a search permitted on some lesser standard of suspicion?
While the Supreme Court addressed some of these questions in
O'Connor v. Ortega,1 it has fallen to lower courts to address many others.
The purpose of this article is to provide a framework within which the
principles outlined in O'Connor for "workplace" searches by government
supervisors can be understood and applied. In sum, when a government
supervisor is considering the search of a government employee's
workspace, a two-part analysis can be utilized to simplify the process.
First, determine whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area to be searched.2 If a reasonable expectation of privacy
t Mr. Lemons is the Branch Chief of the Legal Division at the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center for Border and Transportation Security, a division of the
Department of Homeland Security.
1. 480 U.S. 709, 709-11 (1987) (plurality opinion).
2. See, e.g., State v. Ziegler, 637 So. 2d 109, 112 (La. 1994) ("The O'Connor Court
set forth a two pronged analysis for determining whether an employee's Fourth Amendment
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does exist, then any search that ensues must be reasonable under the totality
of the circumstances.' Before turning to those issues, however, it is
necessary to first define exactly what is meant by the term "workplace."
I. DEFINING THE "WORKPLACE"
"Workplace," as used in this Article, "includes those areas and items
that are related to work and are generally within the employer's control."4
This would include such areas as offices, desks, filing cabinets, computers,
and government vehicles. However, "[n]ot everything that passes through
the confines of the business address can be considered part of the
workplace context .... "5 As a general rule, a government employee would
continue to have an expectation of privacy in his or her personal belongings
that have been brought into the workplace environment. Thus, "Itihe
appropriate standard for a workplace search does not necessarily apply to a
piece of closed personal luggage, a handbag or a briefcase that happens to
be within the employer's business address."6 This is not to say, of course,
that a public employee's personal property can never be included within the
workplace context. In fact, just the opposite is true. While "a court is more
apt to find an employee has standing to challenge the seizure of personal
items or the search of an area where personal items are stored than the
search or seizure of work-related documents or materials,"7 a public
employee's private property may still, in certain rare circumstances, fall
within the scope of a "workplace" search. This generally occurs where an
employee is put on notice that his or her property can be searched as part of
the workplace environment,8 or in situations where the employee is using
the personally-owned property in the workplace to significantly assist the
employee in carrying out his or her official duties.9
For example, in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case of United
rights were violated by an administrative search and seizure. First, the employee must have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, or in the item seized.")
3. Id. ("Second, if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the Fourth Amendment
requires that the search be reasonable under all the circumstances.")
4. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715.
5. Id. at 716.
6. Id.
7. United States v. Anderson, 154 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Broadus, 7 F.3d 460, 463-64 (6th Cir. 1993) (upholding
search of employee's jacket placed in locker where the employee had signed a waiver
explaining that lockers were "subject to inspection at any time by authorized personnel"
(quotations omitted)).
9. See, e.g., Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 490 (7th Cir. 1997) (upholding
search of storage unit and filing cabinet where the employee had purchased the items and
brought them into the workplace to store work-related items).
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States v. Gonzalez,'° the defendant was an employee of a military
exchange. Upon leaving work, he was stopped by a store detective, who
sought permission to search Gonzalez's personal backpack." Because he
had been required to sign a paper indicating that his belongings, such as his
personal backpack, might be inspected as a means of deterring theft among
the employees, Gonzalez consented. 12 Approximately $15.00 worth of
stolen spark plugs were found in the backpack.' 3 After his motion to
suppress this evidence was denied, Gonzalez pleaded guilty to larceny, but
reserved his right to appeal. 4 On appeal, Gonzalez claimed, among other
things, that the search of his backpack violated the Fourth Amendment. In
its ruling, the court did not reach the issue of whether the consent given by
Gonzalez was valid or not. 5 Instead, the court noted that the paper signed
by Gonzalez when he first began working at the exchange put him on
notice that he might be required to submit to a search of his personal
belongings.' 6 Thus, "Gonzalez's expectation of privacy was limited by his
knowledge of the store policy of searching employees' belongings to deter
and apprehend theft."' 7
A similar result was reached by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Gossmeyer v. McDonald.8 Gossmeyer was employed by the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) as a Child Protective
Investigator in the Joliet, Illinois field office. Her "position required her to
investigate instances of child neglect, abuse, and sexual abuse ... [and]
involved photographing evidence for use in court proceedings."' 9 Because
of a lack of storage space, Gossmeyer, at her own expense, purchased two
separate storage devices.2" Specifically, she bought a four-drawer filing
cabinet, in which she kept "evidentiary photographs, photographic
equipment, files, and documents, ' and a two-door storage unit, in which
she kept various items. When a local detective received an anonymous tip
from one of Gossmeyer's co-workers stating that Gossmeyer had
pornographic pictures in these cabinets, the detective notified the DCFS
Office of Inspector General.22 The next day, officials conducted a
warrantless search of Gossmeyer's office, filing cabinet, storage unit, and
10. 300 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2002).
11. Id. at 1050.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1052.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1054.
18. 128 F.3d at 490.
19. Id. at 484.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 485.
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desk and seized some items.23 No charges were ever brought against
Gossmeyer; however, she brought a lawsuit alleging the warrantless search
violated her Fourth Amendment rights. 24 Gossmeyer asserted that because
she had personally bought the filing cabinet and storage unit, those items
were not part of the "workplace" context but rather her personal items not
covered by the O'Connor rules.2 ' However, the court failed to "find an
expectation of privacy in the cabinets simply because Gossmeyer bought
them herself."26 As noted by the court: "The cabinets were not personal
containers which just happened to be in the workplace; they were
containers purchased by Gossmeyer primarily for the storage of work-
related materials.... These items were part of the 'workplace,' not part of
Gossmeyer's personal domain. 21
II. DOES A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY EXIST?
As noted previously, the first step in any search of a public
employee's workplace is to determine whether the employee has a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in that area or item. A reasonable
expectation of privacy exists when (1) an individual exhibits an actual
expectation of privacy, and (2) that expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as being reasonable.28 If there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy, "a workplace search by a public employer will not
violate the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the search's nature and
scope., 29 Government employees can, and often do, establish expectations
of privacy in their government offices, desks, computers, and filing
cabinets. 30 A cursory glance into any government office will show that
individual government employees typically expect some form of privacy,
based on the intermingling of their personal and professional lives (e.g.,
23. Id.
24. Id. at 486.
25. Id. at 487.
26. Id. at 490.
27. Id.
28. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29. Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001); Voyles v. State, 133 S.W. 3d
303, 305 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) ("A defendant has standing to challenge the admission of
evidence obtained by an intrusion by the government or a private individual only if he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.").
30. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion); Gatlin v. United
States, 833 A.2d 995, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that, under the Fourth Amendment, "an
'invaded place' may be a business or other workplace"); see also McGregor v. Greer, 748 F.
Supp. 881, 888 (D.D.C. 1990) (reiterating O'Connor's holding that "a government
employee may be entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy in her office"); People v.
Rosa, 928 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) ("Generally, government employees...
have reasonable expectations of privacy in their offices and workplaces").
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pictures of kids on desks and diplomas on walls). To promote efficiency,
many government agencies allow, if not encourage, individuals to perform
some personal business while in a governmental workplace, such as using a
government telephone to make a personal phone call during a lunch hour.
Nonetheless, an "expectation of privacy in commercial premises... is
different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual's
home., 3' A government employee's expectation of privacy is limited by
the "operational realities of the workplace, ' 32 and "whether an employee
has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a case-by-
case basis."33  Although government ownership of the property to be
searched (e.g., a government-owned computer assigned to a government
employee) is an "important consideration, 34 it does not, standing alone,
dictate a finding that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Courts
have found that "[a]pplicability of the Fourth Amendment does not turn on
the nature of the property interest in the searched premises, but on the
reasonableness of the person's privacy expectation. 35  Courts have
considered a variety of factors when determining whether a government
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her workspace.
The discussion below describes some of the most important factors.
A. Prior Notice to the Employee: Legitimate Regulation
In O'Connor, the Supreme Court held that an employee's expectation
of privacy can be reduced through "legitimate regulation. 36 For example,
31. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987); see also Vega-Rodriguez v. P.R.
Tel Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir. 1997) ("Generally speaking, business premises invite
lesser privacy expectations than do residences" (citing G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States,
429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977))).
32. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (plurality opinion).
33. Id. at 718.
34. United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1134 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted),
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845 (2002); see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91
(1980) (noting that, while ownership of an item does not confer "automatic standing," the
Court has long recognized that property ownership is a "factor to be considered in
determining whether an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated");
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980) (noting that "[p]etitioner's ownership of the
drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be considered" in deciding whether standing existed).
35. Gillard v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1978); Gatlin, 833 A.2d at 1005
("Moreover, 'a legitimate expectation of privacy turns on consideration of all the
surrounding circumstances, including but not limited to defendant's possessory interest."'
(citations omitted)); United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
"privacy analysis does not turn on property rights"); see also Voyles v. State, 133 S.W. 3d
303, 306 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (putting among factors to consider in deciding whether
employee had subjective expectation of privacy is "whether the accused had a property or
possessory interest in the place invaded," although court noted this factor is not dispositive).
36. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717 (plurality opinion).
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"government employees who are notified that their employer has retained
rights to access or inspect information stored on the employer's computers
can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information stored
there. ' 3 7 United States v. Simons3 8 illustrates this point. In Simons, the
Foreign Bureau of Information Services (FBIS), a division of the Central
Intelligence Agency, employed the defendant. FBIS had an Internet usage
policy that (1) specifically prohibited accessing unlawful material, and (2)
prohibited use of the Internet for anything other than official business.
Further, the policy noted that FBIS would "periodically audit, inspect,
and/or monitor the user's Internet access as deemed appropriate. 39 When a
keyword search indicated that Simons had been visiting numerous illicit
web sites from his government computer, multiple searches of his hard
drive were conducted from a remote location, resulting in the discovery of
several pornographic images of minors. Simons challenged the search of
his computer, claiming his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. In
rejecting this challenge, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Simons "did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to the
record or fruits of his Internet use in light of the FBIS Internet policy. ' 4°
The court found that the language of the policy, "placed employees on
37. COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIONS, [hereinafter SEARCHING AND SEIZING] 32 (2002); see also United States v.
Thorn, 375 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding employee had no expectation of privacy
in use and contents of office computer where he "was fully aware of the computer-use
policy, as evidenced by his written acknowledgment of the limits imposed on his computer-
access rights"); State v. Meredith, 56 P.3d 943, 949 (Or. 2002) (Kistler, J. dissenting)
(citations omitted):
To be sure, the operational realities of the workplace may limit the scope of an
employee's privacy rights. And the fact that a government employer tells its
employees in advance that it will be monitoring their use of the office computers
or phones can be an important factor in the analysis.
38. 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 930 (2001); see also United
States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 836 (D. Neb. 2003) (citations omitted):
A company can legitimately regulate the use of its property and is entitled to
adopt policies and practices which place restrictions and conditions on the
personal use of computer equipment. Employees have no objectively
reasonable basis to believe that their activities on a company computer are
private when, through the company's screen notification, they have actual
knowledge that the computer can be searched and, through posted company
policies and e-mail notifications, either know or should know they possess no
expectation of privacy associated with the information they store in or send
through these systems.
39. Simons, 206 F.3d at 396.
40. Id. at 398.
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notice that they could 'not reasonably expect that their Internet activity
would be private."41
A similar result was reached by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
in Muick v. Glenayre Electronics.41 Muick was employed by Glenayre at
the time of his arrest for receiving and possessing child pornography. At
the request of federal authorities, Glenayre seized a laptop computer from
Muick's work area and held it until a search warrant could be obtained.
The computer had been furnished to Muick for his use at work.43 Although
Muick was ultimately convicted for receipt and possession of child
pornography, he brought a lawsuit against Glenayre. He claimed that they
had violated his Fourth Amendment rights by seizing the computer and
turning it over to the federal officers because the computer contained
"'proprietary and privileged personal financial and contact data.""" While
the court determined that Glenayre was not acting as an agent of the federal
government, it nonetheless addressed Muick's expectation of privacy in the
laptop computer that had been issued to him by the company. Initially, the
court noted that it was possible to have "a right of privacy.., in employer-
owned equipment furnished to an employee for use in his place of
employment." '45 So, for example, "[i]f the employer equips the employee's
office with a safe or file cabinet or other receptacle in which to keep his
private papers, he can assume that the contents of the safe are private.' 46
However, in this case, "Glenayre had announced that it could inspect the
laptops that it furnished for the use of its employees," which "destroyed
any reasonable expectation of privacy that Muick might have had ....
As stated by the court:
The laptops were Glenayre's property and it could attach
whatever conditions to their use it wanted to. They didn't have to
be reasonable conditions; but the abuse of access to workplace
computers is so common (workers being prone to use them as
media of gossip, titillation, and other entertainment and
distraction) that reserving a right of inspection is so far from
being unreasonable that the failure to do so might well be thought
irresponsible.4 s
41. Id.
42. 280 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002).
43. Id. at 742.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 743.
46. Id. (citations omitted).
47. Id. (citations omitted).
48. Id.
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Likewise, in State v. Francisco,49 a departmental policy was used to
defeat a police officer's claim of an expectation of privacy in a government
vehicle. Francisco was a narcotics detective who had been issued a
government vehicle that was assigned exclusively to him. Upon receiving
information that Francisco was distributing cocaine, a supervisor ordered a
search of the government vehicle. 0 Cocaine was found inside a briefcase
located in the vehicle. In a motion to suppress, Francisco challenged the
seizure of the cocaine, claiming that his Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated through the search of the vehicle and briefcase.51 The court
rejected this claim, finding that Francisco had no expectation of privacy in
either area. In so holding, the court relied upon the department's policy
and procedure manual, which had a section titled "Search and inspection of
Departmental vehicles (to avoid claims of privacy expectations)."52 This
section provided, in part, that "all departmental vehicles shall be subject to
search and inspection by the Sheriff or his designated representative at
anytime, day or night., 53 Departmental vehicles, as defined by the section,
included "all enclosed containers. 54
While courts have consistently found that "legitimate regulation" in
the form of an agency or departmental policy can eliminate an employee's
expectation of privacy, at least one court has suggested that although the
existence of a policy "weighs heavily in the determination of the
reasonableness of the search," it is not dispositive.55 In DeMaine v.
Samuels, 56 the plaintiff was a Connecticut State Trooper who filed a federal
civil rights lawsuit pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging his
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. At the time of the events in
question, the CONNECTICUT STATE POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND
OPERATIONS MANUAL [hereinafter A&O MANUAL] provided, in pertinent
part, that "the Department reserves the right to inspect issued equipment at
any other time for reasonable purposes," and "[t]he personal property of a
trooper located on department property or within a department vehicle is
subject to inspection or seizure without notice even if the trooper has
locked any container or place where the property is kept., 57 During an
internal affairs investigation into overtime abuses, information was
49. 790 S.W.2d 543 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989).
50. Id. at 544.
51. Id. at 545.
52. Id. at 544.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. DeMaine v. Samuels, No. 3:99CV34, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16277, at *23 (D.
Conn. Sept. 25, 2000) aftd, No. 00-9372, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 2636 (2d Cir. Feb. 15,
2002).
56. Id.
57. Id. at *3-4.
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uncovered that led investigators to believe DeMaine may have had notes in
his possession regarding the activities of other officers that would be vital
to the investigation. In due course, investigators searched DeMaine's
computer, desk, government-issued vehicle, and personal day planner.
None of these searches were conducted pursuant to a warrant. In his
lawsuit, DeMaine claimed the searches violated his Fourth Amendment
rights. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that, based
on the language contained in the A&O MANUAL, DeMaine had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the places searched. Although the
court granted the motion for summary judgment, it noted:
[T]he fact that the A&O Manual authorizes searches of police-
issued equipment at any time for reasonable purposes and any
personal property located on or within department property,
including a state-issued automobile, weighs heavily in the
determination of the reasonableness of the search here. However,
the existence of the policy does not, on its own, dispose of the
question.58
Nevertheless, the court found DeMaine had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in his computer. Here, the court relied in part on the fact that
"all state employees had notice that their use of state computers was subject
to monitoring."59 The court also found that "[g]iven the regulation and the
fact that the desk was state property," DeMaine had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his desk.60 As for his government-issued vehicle,
the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy existed because,
among other things, "the A&O regulation clearly provided that the car and
all items within it were subject to search at any time.' 61 While the court
did find that DeMaine had an expectation of privacy in his day planner, the
search of that item by the investigators was found to be permissible for
reasons that are discussed more fully in Part III.
Finally, while policies and regulations may destroy a public
employee's expectation of privacy in a government workplace, where an
agency has contradictory or unclear policies and directives, that fact may
actually assist an employee in establishing an expectation of privacy. For
example, in Zaffuto v. City of Hammond,62 the Hammond, Louisiana police
department automatically recorded all calls on certain telephone lines to a
58. Id. at *23.
59. Id. at *24.
60. Id. at *25.
61. Id. at *26.
62. 308 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002).
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central taping system.63 A police officer sued his supervisor for illegally
recording a telephone call the officer made from his (the officer's) private
office. In defense, the supervisor claimed that "a department policy that
calls would be taped" made it "not be objectively reasonable for [the
officer] to expect privacy in making a personal phone call from work.'A
' 4
However, three police officers, including Zaffuto, testified that "they
understood the policy to mean that only calls coming into the
communications room (where outside citizens would call) were being
recorded, not calls from private offices. 65 Based on this testimony, the
court determined that a "reasonable juror could conclude.., that Zaffuto
expected that his call to his wife would be private, and that that expectation
was objectively reasonable." 66
Similarly, in Haynes v. Office of Attorney General Kline,67 the plaintiff
was hired as an Assistant Attorney General. During an orientation he was
given when hired, Haynes was informed that his government computer
"had two files: private and public," and that "he could put personal
information in the private file and that no one would have access to it.,'6
Additionally, he was notified that "he should put other documents
concerning his work in the public file. ' 69 However, the computers at the
Attorney General's office also displayed a computer usage policy when
they were turned on. Among other things, the policy noted that "[tihere
shall be no expectation of privacy in using this system; however,
intentional access to another user's e-mail without permission shall be
prohibited... ."'0 Within nine months of accepting the job, Haynes was
terminated. Afterwards, "employees of the Attorney General's office
retrieved and reviewed information contained on [Haynes's] computer,
including personal e-mails.'
Haynes filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, in which he
asserted that members of the Attorney General's office had violated his
Fourth Amendment rights by reviewing the personal information he had
stored on his government computer. In response, the defendants claimed
that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred because Haynes had no
expectation of privacy on the computer in light of the express statement
displayed when the machine was turned on ("There shall be no expectation
63. Id. at 486.
64. Id. at 489.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 298 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Kan. 2003).
68. Id. at 1157.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1158.
71. Id.
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of privacy in using this system"72). While finding that the computer use
policy "obviously [had] considerable significance," 3 the court ultimately
concluded that whether Haynes had an expectation of privacy remained an
open question based on the contradictory information he had received:
The court, however, must consider this fact in conjunction with
the other information provided in the policy as well as the oral
representations made by AG employees to the plaintiff. These
other facts, suggest that plaintiffs expectation of privacy was
objectively reasonable.... The facts that we have learned include
the following: employees are allowed to use their work
computers for private communications; employees are told how
to create "public" and "private" files; employees are advised that
"intentional access to another user's e-mail without permission"
is prohibited; employees are given passwords to prevent others
from gaining access to their computers; and there was no
evidence that any AG official had ever monitored or viewed any
private files, documents or e-mails of any employee.74
B. Common Practices and Procedures
In O'Connor, the Supreme Court recognized that "[p]ublic employees'
expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets ... may be
reduced by virtue of actual office practices and procedures. .... ""
Alternatively, common office practices and procedures may permit a
government employee to establish an expectation of privacy in an area
where one would otherwise not exist.7 6 For example, in the Third Circuit
72. Id. at 1162.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion); see also Gillard
v. Schmidt, 579 F.2d 825, 829 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[A]n employer may conduct a search in
accordance with a regulation or practice that would dispel in advance any expectations of
privacy." (citation omitted)); People v. Neal, 486 N.E.2d 898,901 (111. 1985) (upholding the
search of government-issued vehicle and raincoat where police officer had no expectation of
privacy, in part, because these items "were subject to periodic inspections by the
defendant's superiors under the policy and practice of the Illinois State Police," and "the
defendant was aware of such inspections and the manner in which they were conducted");
Moore v. Constantine, 594 N.Y.S.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (affirming the search
of police officer's locker where trooper "had no reasonable expectation of privacy from his
superiors who routinely obtained access to the work-related contents of petitioner's
locker.").
76. See, e.g., Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that an
employee had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of office computer
because, inter alia, his employer did not have a "general practice of routinely conducting
searches of office computers").
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Court of Appeals case of United States v. Speights,77 the defendant was a
police officer who retained a locker at his police headquarters. Both a
personal lock and a lock that had been issued by the department were used
to secure the locker. There were no regulations that addressed the issue of
personal locks on the police lockers, nor was there any regulation or notice
that the lockers could be searched. There was also no regulation as to what
a police officer might keep in the locker. Upon receiving information that
Speights had a sawed-off shotgun in his locker, the locker was opened with
a master key (for the police-issued lock) and bolt cutters (for Speights'
personal lock). A sawed-off shotgun was recovered in the search, and
Speights was convicted of illegally possessing the weapon. On appeal, he
claimed his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the search of
his locker. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding that "no
regulation and no police practice" existed to justify the search of Speights'
locker. According to the court, "only if the police department had a
practice of opening lockers with private locks without the consent of the
user would [Speights'] privacy expectation be unreasonable. 78  While
there had been scattered instances of inspections of the lockers for
cleanliness (three or four in twelve years), "there [was] insufficient
evidence to conclude that the police department practice negated
Speights' [sic] otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy."79
Other federal courts, in analogous cases, have reached parallel
conclusions. For example, in United States v. Donato,80 the search of a
locker maintained by an employee of the United States Mint was upheld
because, among other things, the locker was "regularly inspected by the
Mint security guards for sanitation purposes."'" In Shaffer v. Field,82 the
search of a police officer's locker was upheld in part because three
previous searches had been conducted in the past.83 In Schowengerdt v.
United States,84 the court found no reasonable expectation of privacy could
be expected in an office or credenza due to "extremely tight security
procedures," to include "frequent scheduled and random searches of
workspaces by security guards. ' 85 In each of these cases, the courts "relied
on specific regulations and practices in finding that an expectation of
privacy was not reasonable., 86 Alternatively, in United States v. Taketa,
87
77. 557 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1977).
78. Id. at 364.
79. Id.
80. 269 F. Supp. 921 (E.D. Pa. 1967), aft'd, 379 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1967).
81. Id. at 923.
82. 339 F. Supp. 997 (C.D. Cal. 1972), aff'd, 484 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1973).
83. Id. at 1003.
84. 944 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1991).
85. Id. at 485.
86. United States v. Speights, 557 F.2d 362, 365 (3d Cir. 1977).
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the court held that a government employee had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his office because, among other things, the office was not "not
open to the public, and was not subjected to regular visits of inspection by
[agency] personnel. 'a
C. Openness and Accessibility
Courts will often look to the openness and accessibility of a
workspace to determine whether an expectation of privacy can be
sustained.89 Generally speaking, the more an item or area in question is
given over to an employee's exclusive use, the more likely an expectation
of privacy would be found.9 ° For example, "where a public employee has
[his or] her own office or desk which co-workers and superiors normally do
not enter, and where no agency policy or regulation warns the employee
that an expectation of privacy is unreasonable, an expectation of privacy
may be reasonable."'" Similarly, the "use of passwords and locking office
doors to restrict an employer's access to computer files is evidence of the
employee's subjective expectation of privacy in those files. 92 Where an
employee is the only individual to have a key to the area in question, that
87. 923 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1991).
88. Id. at 673.
89. See Stewart v. Evans, 351 F.3d 1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that employee
had no expectation of privacy in a safe where the employee "had no control whatever over
access to the office containing the safe or to the safe itself"); People v. Holland, 591
N.Y.S.2d 744, 747 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1992):
a person's legitimate expectation of privacy in a work area will vary depending
on an evaluation of the 'surrounding circumstances' including the function of
the workplace and the person's efforts to protect his area from intrusion. A
receptionist in a hospital emergency room waiting area could not reasonably
expect that his or her desk top would not be perused by those who seek to avail
themselves of the hospital's services but could legitimately expect that the
drawers of that desk would not be invaded.
90. See United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 671 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[A] reasonable
expectation of privacy [exists] in an area 'given over to [an employee's] exclusive use."');
Voyles v. State, 133 S.W.3d 303, 350 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an employee had
no reasonable expectation of privacy over work computer where, inter alia, he did not have
"complete dominion and control" over the computer and it was "available for use by [other]
substitute teachers").
91. McGregor v. Greer, 748 F. Supp. 881, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Holland, 591
N.Y.S. 2d at 746 ("[Ilt is clear that an individual employee has an expectation of privacy in
a locked, private office .... ).
92. United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 835 (D. Neb. 2003); see also United
States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that employee demonstrated
subjective expectation of privacy over his office and computer where door to office was
closed and locked and passwords had been installed on the computer), remanded on other
grounds, 537 U.S. 802, vacating judgment and remanding, 313 F.3d 891 (5th Cir. 2002).
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factor, while perhaps not dispositive, would weigh in favor of the employee
having an expectation of privacy. 93
Alternatively, the more accessible the item or area is to others, the less
likely an individual employee's claim of privacy would be accepted
94
Among the factors to consider in such a determination would include (a)
whether the employee shared the area with anyone else, (b) whether others
could be expected to enter the area or disturb papers in it without
permission, (c) whether the employee took normal precautions customarily
taken by those seeking privacy; and (d) whether the employee put the item
or area to some private use.95 Offices that are "continually entered by
fellow employees and other visitors during the workday for conferences,
consultations, and other work-related visits... may be so open to fellow
employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable. 96
Additionally, where areas are, by their very nature, "open" and "public," no
93. United States v. Chaves, 169 F.3d 687, 691 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that an
employee who had only key to warehouse had a "measure of control and ability to exclude
others" that resulted in finding of expectation of privacy). Nevertheless, the court noted in
Chaves that "possession of a key, without more, might not be sufficient to establish a
reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 691.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Thorn, 375 F.3d 679, 684 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that
employee's expectation of privacy in office, desk and filing cabinet "was limited in scope
because other... employees had keys that allowed them to access the office and the
contents of the desk and cabinets"); Luellen v. City of East Chicago, 350 F.3d 604, 612 n.5
(7th Cir. 2003) (suggesting, but not deciding, that employee likely could not have
established expectation of privacy in government vehicle where (a) vehicle was owned and
maintained by fire department; (b) vehicle was assigned to position, not employee
personally; (c) fire department retained a key to vehicle; (d) Fire Chief testified vehicle
could be inspected on his permission; and (e) Fire Chief had authorized such an inspection
in the past); United States v. Hamdan, 891 F. Supp. 88, 95 (E.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 101 F.3d
686 (2d Cir. 1996) ("By contrast, the less private a work area - and the less control a
defendant has over that work area - the less likely standing is to be found."); see also
Thornton v. Univ. Civil Serv. Merit Bd., 507 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that there is no expectation of privacy for police officer where, inter alia, "[t]he
police department office was used by all ... police officers to conduct police business and
was not plaintiff's private office"); State v. McLellan, 744 A.2d 611 (N.H. 1999); Shaul v.
Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 218 F. Supp. 2d 266, 270 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(holding that teacher had no reasonable expectation of privacy in classroom where
classroom was "open to students, colleagues, custodians, administrators, parents, and
substitute teachers," it was not a private office, and "he did not have exclusive use of any
furniture in the room").
95. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968); United States v. Best, 255 F. Supp.
2d 905, 913 (N.D. Ind. 2003); United States v. Evaschuck, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1364 (M.D.
Fla. 1999) (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987)); Voyles, 133 S.W.3d at
306.
96. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 717-18 (plurality opinion); see also Holland, 591 N.Y.S.2d
at 746-47 ("It is... obvious that an employee who has his desk positioned in the middle of
an area open to the public cannot reasonably expect privacy from the eye of a stranger who
is lawfully on the premises.").
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reasonable expectation of privacy can exist in that area.97 So, for example,
a public employee would not generally have an expectation of privacy in
the common hallway of a business, because of its open access to visitors
and other employees of the business.98
Nevertheless, the fact that others may be permitted access to an
employee's office, desk, computer, or filing cabinet does not, standing
alone, automatically destroy an employee's privacy expectation.99 As one
court has noted: "Privacy does not require solitude."'00 For example, "a
private space (such as a desk) within an otherwise public pace (such as a
government building) will justify an expectation of privacy.''
Additionally, the existence of a master key will not defeat an employee's
expectation of privacy in his or her office,0 2 nor will an employee's failure
to consistently shut and lock an office door automatically sacrifice any
expectation of privacy in that area.
10 3
Illustrative on this concept is Coats v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan
Housing Authority,1' n in which the employee (Coats) brought an attachd
case containing a firearm to his workplace. He laid the attach6 case next to
his desk, which was located within a cubicle work station that had six-foot
partitions for walls. Another employee entered the cubicle to answer a
ringing phone and observed the barrel of a firearm in plain view in the
unzippered case. A Housing Authority police officer arrived, searched the
97. Thompson v. Johnson County Cmty. Coll., 930 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1996)
affd, 108 F.3d 1388 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Security personnel and other college employees,
including maintenance and service personnel, had unfettered access to this storage room.
Consequently, defendants argue that the open, public nature of the security personnel locker
area defeats any reasonable expectation of privacy in this area. The court agrees.");
O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 868 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (N.D. Iowa 1994) (holding that,
where an unlocked desk or credenza was located in an "open, accessible area," no
reasonable expectation of privacy existed).
98. Gillespie v. Dallas Hous. Auth., No. 3:01-CV-895-R, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29, at
*22-23 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 2, 2003) (where video camera was mounted in a common hallway,
the court noted that the employee "would certainly have no objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in the common hallway" because "[b]eing an undifferentiated area,
all employees used the common hallway").
99. See United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that, where
employee had a private office, "the ability of a select few of his coworkers to access the
office does not mean that the office was 'so open to fellow employees or the public that no
expectation of privacy is reasonable."') (citation omitted), remanded on other grounds by,
537 U.S. 802 (2002).
100. United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 673 (9th Cir. 1991).
101. Caldarola v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 575 (2d Cir. 2003).
102. Taketa, 923 F.2d at 673 ("Furthermore, the appellants correctly point out that
allowing the existence of a master key to overcome the expectation of privacy would defeat
the legitimate privacy interest of any hotel, office, or apartment occupant.").
103. Id. ("Nor was the expectation of privacy defeated by O'Brien's failure to shut and
lock his door at all times.").
104. No. 78012, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1699, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2001).
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attach6 case, and confirmed the existence of the gun. Based on the
incident, Coats was terminated. He then filed suit alleging, in part, that his
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated by the search of his cubicle.
The court disagreed, holding that Coats had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the cubicle. Specifically:
Coats' [sic] cubicle was one of several cubicles in a larger office
and was, in some situations, open to view from certain vantage
points in the larger office. The cubicle was open to other
employees with access to the cubicle for legitimate work-related
reasons, such as, employees ... picking up telephone calls
throughout the office using, in this instance, Coats'[sic] cubicle
telephone line. Accordingly, Coats did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the cubicle itself. Thus, the entry of the
cubicle.., did not violate Coats' [sic] Fourth Amendment
protections.
1 05
In Brannen v. Kings Local School District Board of Education,0 6 the
employees were custodians at a high school. Believing that some of the
third-shift custodians were spending inordinate amounts of time in the
break room during their shifts, their supervisor received permission from
the school superintendent to install a hidden video camera in the break
room. The camera recorded actions, but no sounds or conversations. The
employees brought a lawsuit against the school, claiming the installation of
the video camera violated their Fourth Amendment rights. In rejecting this
claim, the court found the employees had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the break room, based upon its open and public nature. The
court noted that other employees of the school had "unfettered access" to
the break room, including "the principal and most of the teachers. '0 7
Additionally, the court found:
The break room was more of an all-purpose utility room that
contained a washing machine, clothes dryer, cleaning supplies,
cleaning machines, lockers, a refrigerator, and a microwave oven.
Teachers could access the room whenever they needed something
contained inside. Crawford described the break room as "open
all the time." The break room was so open to fellow employees
that the custodians could not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in this area.0 8
105. ld. at*10-11.
106. 761 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
107. Id. at 91.
108. Id. at91-92.
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On the other hand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals case of
Leventhal v. Knapek'°9 illustrates how the realities of the workplace can
result in a finding that a reasonable expectation of privacy does exist.
Leventhal had a private tax preparation business. In running the business,
he impermissibly loaded unauthorized software on his government
computer, which was a violation of agency policy. He committed a second
violation when he improperly used agency computer equipment to print
private tax returns. A warrantless search of his computer in response to an
anonymous letter alleging misconduct uncovered the unauthorized
software. After disciplinary actions were completed, Leventhal filed suit
alleging the warrantless search of his computer was a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. While the court ultimately disagreed with Leventhal's
assertion, they did find that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the computer. Specifically, Leventhal's agency had neither "a general
practice of routinely conducting searches of office computers," nor had the
agency "placed Leventhal on notice that he should have no expectation of
privacy in the contents of his office computer."1 ° Additionally, the court
noted:
Leventhal occupied a private office with a door. He had
exclusive use of the desk, filing cabinet, and computer in his
office. Leventhal did not share use of his computer with other
employees in the Accounting Bureau nor was there evidence that
visitors or the public had access to his computer.'' 1
Finally, while support personnel may have had access to Leventhal's
computer at all times, "there was no evidence that these searches were
frequent, widespread, or extensive enough to constitute an 'atmosphere so
open to fellow employees or the public that no expectation of privacy is
reasonable.'.. 2
D. The Position of the Employee
Courts will consider both the position occupied by the employee and
the surrounding work environment when determining whether a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists. For example, "when an individual enters into
an employment situation with high security requirements, it becomes less
reasonable for her to assume that her conduct on the job will be treated as
109. 266 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2001).
110. Id. at 74.
111. Id. at 73-74.
112. Id. at 74 (citation omitted).
2004]
18 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:1
private."' 13 Likewise, where an employee is part of an industry that is
subjected to pervasive regulation to ensure the safety and fitness of its
employees, any expectation of privacy the employee might have may be
reduced.' 14 As noted by the Supreme Court: "[I]t is plain that certain forms
of public employment may diminish privacy expectations even with respect
to... personal searches. Employees of the United States Mint, for
example, should expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches
when they leave the workplace every day."".5 This is especially true where
the subject of the search is a law enforcement officer. In cases involving
law enforcement officers, the officer's "special status must be factored into
the reasonableness analysis, for it is within the State's power to regulate the
conduct of its police officers even when the conduct involves the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right.""' 6 While law enforcement officers do
not lose their constitutional rights by virtue of accepting their position," 7
there is a "substantial public interest in ensuring the appearance and
actuality of police integrity," in that "a trustworthy police force is a
precondition of minimal social stability in our imperfect society." ' 1 8 This
"interest in police integrity... may justify some intrusions on the privacy
of police officers which the Fourth Amendment would not otherwise
tolerate."''9
A case on point is Biehunik v. Felicetta,12 involving allegations of
police brutality. After several citizens were severely beaten by a large
group of police officers, the police commissioner ordered sixty two police
113. Cowles v. State, 23 P.3d 1168, 1173 (Alaska 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1131
(2002).
114. See, e.g., Petersen v. City of Mesa, 83 P.3d 35, 41 (Ariz. 2004) ("[I]ndividuals who
elect to become firefighters should anticipate a diminished expectation of privacy and
should reasonably expect some intrusion into matters involving their health and fitness.");
Chicago Fire Fighters Union, Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 717 F. Supp. 1314, 1318 (N.D. Ill.
1989) ("[T]he highly regulated nature of the fire department serves to lower the expectation
of privacy of individual fire fighters.").
115. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 671 (1989).
116. Morris v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 290 A.D.2d 22, 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (noting law enforcement officers
"are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights").
118. Biehunik v. Felicetta, 441 F.2d 228, 230 (2d Cir. 1971).
119. Kirkpatrick v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1986); see also
Shaffer v. Field, 339 F. Supp. 997, 1003 (C.D. Cal. 1972) ("The Sheriff's Department has a
substantial interest in assuring not only the appearance but the actuality of police integrity.
It is not unreasonable that they have the right of inspection.., so that the public may have
confidence in public servants."); Caruso v. Ward, 72 N.Y.2d 432, 439 (N.Y. 1988) ("The
privacy expectations of police officers must be regarded as even further diminished by
virtue of their membership in a paramilitary force, the integrity of which is a recognized and
important State concern." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
120. 441 F.2d at 228.
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officers to participate in a lineup for investigative purposes. The officers
moved to prevent the lineup, claiming that it violated their constitutional
rights. In rejecting the officers' argument, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals noted, "policemen, who voluntarily accept the unique states of
watchman of the social order, may not reasonably expect the same freedom
from governmental restraints which are designed to ensure his fitness for
office as from similar governmental actions not so designed."' 21 Further,
said the court, "[t]he policeman's employment relationship by its nature
implies that in certain aspects of his affairs, he does not have the full
privacy and liberty from police officials that he would otherwise enjoy. '''22
A similar result was reached by the same court, albeit in a different
context, in Sheppard v. Beerman.123 Sheppard, a law clerk, brought a civil
action against the judge for whom he clerked, alleging that the judge
impermissibly searched his desk in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In
holding that Sheppard had no reasonable expectation of privacy in regards
to the desk, the court relied upon the unique "working relationship between
a judge and her law clerk.
1 24
Unlike a typical employment relationship ... , in order for a
judicial chambers to function efficiently, an absolute free flow of
information between the clerk and the judge is usually necessary.
Accordingly, the clerk has access to all the documents pertaining
to a case.... In turn, the judge necessarily has access to the files
and papers kept by the clerk, which will often include the clerk's
notes from discussions with the judge. Because of this distinctive
open access to documents characteristic of judicial chambers, we
agree with the district court's determination that Sheppard had
''no reasonable expectation of privacy in chambers'
appurtenances, embracing desks, file cabinets or other work
areas."
125
E. Waiver of Rights
Government employees may actually waive their expectation of
privacy as a precondition of receiving a certain benefit from their
employer. In the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals case of American Postal
Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 12 postal employees were
121. Id. at 231.
122. Id.
123. 18 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 1994).
124. Id. at 152.
125. Id.
126. 871 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1989).
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eligible to receive personal lockers at their postal facility. Before being
allowed to do so, however, each employee had to sign a waiver that noted
the locker was "subject to inspection at any time by authorized
personnel."' 127 Further, the administrative manual of the Postal Services
noted that all property provided by the Postal Service was "at all times
subject to examination and inspection by duly authorized postal officials in
the discharge of their official duties.' '128 Finally, the collective bargaining
agreement for these employees "provided for random inspection of the
lockers under specified circumstances.' 29 As noted by the court: "In light
of the clearly expressed provisions permitting random and unannounced
locker inspections under the conditions described above, the collective
class of plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their
respective lockers that was protected by the Fourth Amendment."'
30
Similarly, in United States v. Bunkers,13' the defendant was a postal
employee suspected of stealing parcels from the mail. As an incident of
her employment, she had been provided a locker " ... to be used for*(her)
convenience and.., subject to search by supervisors and postal
inspectors.' 32 The Union Agreement provided that: "Except in matters
where there is reasonable cause to suspect criminal activity, a steward or an
employee shall be given the opportunity to be present in any inspection of
employees' lockers."'3 3 Following the recurring theft of C.O.D. parcels,
investigators discovered that the defendant's work schedule coincided with
the losses. Surveillance was initiated, and she was observed taking a parcel
from her work area to the women's locker room and, within one minute,
returning without the package. Investigators then requested the defendant's
supervisor search the locker. Throughout the day, three warrantless
searches of the locker were conducted outside of the defendant's presence,
and a total of nine mail parcels were discovered. Following her conviction
for postal theft, the defendant appealed, claiming her Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by the warrantless search of her locker. In rejecting
her claim, the court determined the defendant had relinquished her Fourth
Amendment rights based on her "voluntary entrance into postal service
employment and her acceptance and use of the locker subject to the
regulatory leave of inspection and search and the labor union's contractual
rights of search upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity .. .
127. Id. at 557.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 560.
131. 521 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1975).
132. Id. at 1219.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1221 (citation omitted).
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III. IF A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOES EXIST, WAS THE
SEARCH REASONABLE?
If an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
workplace, then an intrusion into that area qualifies as a "search" governed
by the Fourth Amendment. 35  "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by the Government,
even when the Government acts as an employer."' 36 Generally speaking,
when searches are performed, courts have expressed a strong preference
that they be performed pursuant to warrants. 37  It is well-settled that
searches conducted without warrants are per se unreasonable unless an
exception to the warrant requirement, such as consent, is present.
138
Nevertheless, the Court has recognized that in certain special situations, the
requirement to obtain a warrant is impractical. "In particular, a warrant
requirement is not appropriate when the burden of obtaining a warrant is
likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search. 139 Such is
the case with public employers, who find themselves in a somewhat unique
situation. On the one hand, they are obligated to follow the mandates of
the Fourth Amendment; on the other, they are responsible for ensuring the
efficient and proper operation of their specific department or agency. In
cases involving searches conducted by a public employer, courts must
"balance the invasion of the employees' legitimate expectations of privacy
against the government's need for supervision, control, and the efficient
135. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) ("[A] Fourth Amendment
search does not occur... unless 'the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search,' and 'society [is] willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable."') (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
136. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989); see also
State v. McCormick, No. 19505, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4809, at *34-35 (Ohio Ct. App.,
Oct. 3, 2003) ("The Fourth Amendment governs searches and seizures by government
employers or supervisors."); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 809 A.2d 411, 414 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2002) ("Stated otherwise, searches and seizures by government employers or supervisors of
the private property of their employees are subject to the restraints of the Fourth
Amendment.").
137. United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting "there is a
strong preference for searches... conducted under the judicial auspices of a warrant").
138. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (noting the "cardinal principle"
that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions") (emphasis in original) (citation
omitted).
139. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
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operation of the workplace."'"4 As noted by the Supreme Court:
Employers and supervisors are focused primarily on the need to
complete the government agency's work in a prompt and efficient
manner. An employer may have need for correspondence, or a
file or report available only in an employee's office while the
employee is away from the office. Or ... employers may need to
safeguard or identify state property or records in an office in
connection with a pending investigation into suspected employee
misfeasance.
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever
the employer wished to enter an employee's office, desk, or file
cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the
routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome.
Imposing unwieldy warrant procedures in such cases upon
supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar
with such procedures, is simply unreasonable.
14'
Accordingly, the Court has carved out an exception to the probable
cause and warrant requirements for public employers, noting "[tihe special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the... probable-
cause requirement impracticable for legitimate work-related,
noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related
misconduct.' 42  In O'Connor, the Supreme Court outlined two basic
categories of workplace searches: (1) Searches for work-related purposes
(either non-investigatory or for the purpose of investigating workplace
140. Id. at 719-720; see also, Morris v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 290 A.D.2d 22, 27
(N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
141. Id. at 721-22.
142. Id. at 725 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Leventhal v.
Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The 'special needs' of public employers may...
allow them to dispense with the probable cause and warrant requirements when conducting
workplace searches related to investigations of work-related misconduct." (citation
omitted)); United States v. Fernandes, 272 F.3d 938, 942 (7th Cir. 2001) ("This court has
held that a warrant or probable cause standard does not apply when a government employer
conducts a search of its employees' offices, desks or files." (citation omitted)); United States
v. Reilly, No. 01 CR 1114 (RPP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9685, at *10 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. May
31, 2002) ("Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant and probable
cause, there are some well-established exceptions to these requirements. One such
exception applies to the government's interest in the efficient and proper operation of a
government workplace."); Fink v. Ryan, 673 N.E.2d 281, 284 (ll. 1996), (noting the
Supreme Court "has found the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable in a
variety of circumstances," including those involving "searches of government employees'
desks and offices").
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misconduct), and (2) searches for evidence of criminal violations. Each of
these will be addressed in turn.
A. Searches for Work-Related Purposes
For the O'Connor exception to apply, the search in question must be
work-related. "This element limits the O'Connor exception to
circumstances in which the government actors who conduct the search act
in their capacity as employers, rather than law enforcers." 143  While
"private citizens cannot [generally] have their property searched without
probable cause ... in many circumstances government employees can.'
Work-related searches typically fall within one of two similar, but distinct,
circumstances. First, a search of a government employee's workspace may
be conducted for a work-related, non-investigatory purpose, such as
retrieving a needed file. "The governmental interest justifying work-
related intrusions by public employers is the efficient and proper operation
of the workplace." '145 Operational efficiency "would suffer if employers
were required to have probable cause before they entered an employee's
desk for the purpose of finding a file or piece of office correspondence. 146
For this reason, "public employers must be given wide latitude to enter
employee offices for work-related, noninvestigatory reasons."'
' 47
Second, a search of an employee's workspace may be performed
during an investigation into allegations of work-related misconduct, such as
improper computer usage. As noted by the Supreme Court:
Public employers have an interest in ensuring that their agencies
operate in an effective and efficient manner, and the work of
these agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency,
incompetence, mismanagement, or other work-related
misfeasance of its employees. Indeed, in many cases, public
employees are entrusted with tremendous responsibility, and the
consequences of their misconduct or incompetence to both the
agency and the public interest can be severe.... In our view,
therefore, a probable cause requirement for searches of the type at
issue here would impose intolerable burdens on public
employers. The delay in correcting the employee misconduct
caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable
suspicion will be translated into tangible and often irreparable
143. SEARCHING AND SEIZING, supra note 37, at 34.
144. Rutan v. Republican Party of II1., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987).
146. Id. at 723.
147. Id. at 723.
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damage to the agency's work, and ultimately to the public
interest. 148
In either of the above situations, the search must be "reasonable"
based on the totality of the circumstances. 49  Generally, "a public
employer's search of an area in which an employee had a reasonable
expectation of privacy is 'reasonable' when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of its purpose.1 5 ° Under this standard, the search must
meet two requirements: (1) the search must be justified at its inception, and
(2) the search must be permissible in scope."' This is the equivalent of the
"reasonable suspicion" standard outlined by the Supreme Court in Terry v.
Ohio.
15 1
1. Justified At Inception
A supervisor's search of a government employee's office "will be
'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct, or that the search is necessary for a noninvestigatory
work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file."' 5 3  Stated
differently, a supervisor must have an articulable reason (or reasons) for
believing that evidence of work-related misconduct or work-related
materials are located in the place to be searched.
148. Id. at 724.
149. Id. at 725-26; see also United States v. Femandes, 272 F.3d 938, 942 (7th Cir.
2001) (noting "government employers are subject to a reasonableness standard when they
conduct workplace searches" (citation and internal brackets omitted)); Finkelstein v. State
Personnel Bd., 267 Cal. Rptr. 133, 135 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that "public employer
intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for
noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances").
150. Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 73 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
151. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987); see also Brannen v. Board of
Education, 761 N.E.2d 84, 92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) ("There is a two-part test to determine
the reasonableness of a search conducted by a government employer. First, a court must
consider whether the governmental action was justified at its inception.... Second, the
search as actually conducted must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that
justified the interference in the first place.").
152. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); see also Wiley v. Dep't of Justice, 328 F.3d 1346, 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (noting Supreme Court has found "workplace searches undertaken either for
noninvestigatory work-related purposes or to investigate work-related misconduct may be
predicated on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause").
153. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 726.
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In United States v. Simons154 (discussed in Part II, A, above), the
employee's computer was initially searched from a remote location,
revealing over 1,000 picture files containing pornographic images.
Approximately two weeks later, an individual "physically entered Simons'
office, removed the original hard drive, [and] replaced it with a
11155copy .... No warrant had been obtained prior to this physical
intrusion. While the court rejected Simons' argument that he had a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the computer (based on his
employer's Internet use policy), they noted the "entry into Simons' office
to retrieve the hard drive present[ed] a distinct question." '156 Unlike the
computer itself, the court found Simons did have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in his office.'57 The physical entry to retrieve the hard drive was
a "search" implicating the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court was
required to determine whether the "warrantless entry into Simons' office to
retrieve the hard drive was reasonable .... ." Noting that O'Connor
allowed a warrantless workplace search based on "a government
employer's interest in the 'efficient and proper operation of the
workplace,"" 58 the court analyzed the physical entry into Simons' office
under that standard. The court found the search justified at its inception
based on the information already in the hands of Simons' employer at the
time of the search. Specifically, "at the inception of the search, FBIS had
'reasonable grounds for suspecting' that the hard drive would yield
evidence of misconduct because FBIS was already aware that Simons had
misused his Internet access to download over a thousand pornographic
images, some of which involved minors."'59
In Gossmeyer v. McDonald'6° (discussed in Part I, above), the
employee occupied a position that required her to investigate child sexual
and physical abuse and to take photographs of the children for use in
possible court proceedings. After an anonymous tip was received stating
that Gossmeyer had "pornographic pictures of children in her file cabinet at
work,' 6' a warrantless search of Gossmeyer's office, filing cabinet, storage
unit, and desk was conducted. Some items were seized, but no charges
154. 206 F.3d 392 (4th Cir. 2000).
155. Id. at 396.
156. Id. at 399.
157. Id. ("Here, Simons has shown that he had an office that he did not share. As noted
above, the operational realities of Simons' workplace may have diminished his legitimate
privacy expectation. However, there is no evidence in the record of any workplace
practices, procedures, or regulations that had such an effect. We therefore conclude that, on
this record, Simons possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy in his office." (footnote
omitted)).
158. Id. at 400 (citation omitted).
159. Id. at 401 (citation omitted).
160. 128 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1997).
161. Id. at485.
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were ever brought against her. Gossmeyer filed a lawsuit alleging the
warrantless search violated her Fourth Amendment rights. In applying the
O'Connor standard, the court initially addressed whether the search was
justified at its inception. In finding that it was, the court relied on the
following facts. First, while the search was initiated based upon an
anonymous tip, the tip was sufficiently reliable to justify the search that
was ultimately conducted.
The informant identified herself as one of Gossmeyer's co-
workers in the Joliet office; made serious and specific allegations
of misconduct - that Gossmeyer had pornographic pictures of
children; and stated where those pictures could be found - in
Gossmeyer's file cabinets and desk. The search took place one
day after Farley received the tip and passed it on to the 01G. In
addition, there was reason to believe that Gossmeyer's cabinets
were more likely than most to contain such pictures. She had
unusual access to children and extraordinary authority (conferred
by the state) to take such pictures.'62
Additionally, Gossmeyer's own duties supported the reasonableness
of the search. She was the only person in the Joliet office who
photographed and maintained pictures of abused children, which provided
her an opportunity to commit the crimes alleged. Further, "the search was
prompted by serious allegations of specific misconduct against an
employee in a sensitive position.' 63 In the end, the "allegations called for
prompt attention and.., the search was justified at its inception.
' ' 64
Finally, in Williams v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 65 the plaintiff
was placed on leave of absence by his employer, the Philadelphia Housing
Authority (PHA). Prior to leaving, however, Williams had been asked to
remove his personal belongings from the work desk he used. A search of
the desk by Williams' employer (Galeota) during his absence revealed a
computer disk that, upon review, was found to contain both PHA legal
documents and some of Williams' personal items. Williams claimed
ownership of the disk, but his request for its return was denied by PHA.
PHA did offer to provide a copy of the disk to Williams, but he refused.
He then filed suit alleging his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated
by the seizure and retention of the disk. The court rejected this claim. In
deciding that the O'Connor "reasonableness" standard was the one to be
applied in this case, the court noted:
162. Id. at 491.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. 826 F. Supp. 952 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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[E]mployers most often enter their employees' work area for
work-related reasons and not for reasons related to misconduct.
For example, an employer may need to retrieve a file or report
from the office of an employee who is away from the office in
order to complete a task. Thus, in order to maintain efficiency
and productivity, the [Supreme] Court has granted employers
wide latitude to enter employers' offices for work-related, non-
investigative reasons.
66
Here, Williams failed to satisfy the first requirement of the O'Connor
"reasonableness" standard. Specifically, he failed to present evidence that
the search was not "justified at its inception." Williams himself
acknowledged in his complaint that Galeota was acting in her "official
capacity" when she seized the computer disk. Accordingly, said the court,
"Galeota merely exercised her discretion in maintaining efficiency and
productivity in the workplace. Galeota reasonably located the disk in order
to distribute the vacated workload to the remaining attorneys."'' 67 Thus,
because the seizure of the computer disk was made for an official, work-
related purpose, the seizure was "justified at its inception."
2. Permissible In Scope
In order to be reasonable under the standard announced in O'Connor,
the search must also be permissible in scope. 168  A search will be
"permissible in its scope when 'the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light
of... the nature of the [misconduct].','" 69 This means that the search may
be made of only those areas where the item sought is reasonably expected
to be located.
As an example, we can look once again at the Simons case discussed
in Part II A. After receiving information that Simons had downloaded
numerous pornographic images to his office computer, the hard drive of the
computer was retrieved during a physical entry into Simons' office. This
physical entry constituted a search, which the court analyzed under the
O'Connor standard. As noted in the preceding section, the court found the
physical intrusion to retrieve the hard drive justified at its inception. The
court then addressed the second part of the reasonableness test, namely,
166. Id. at 954.
167. Id.
168. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 707, 726 (1987) (plurality opinion).
169. Id. quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
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whether the search was permissible in scope. In finding the scope of the
search permissible, the court noted "[t]he measure adopted, entering
Simons' office, was reasonably related to the objective of the search,
retrieval of the hard drive."" 7  The search was not found to be overly
intrusive, because "there [was] no suggestion that Harper searched Simons'
desk or any other items in the office; rather, [he] simply crossed the floor of
Simons' office, switched hard drives, and exited.,
1 7'
In Gossmeyer, the court also addressed whether the search of
Gossmeyer's office was permissible in scope. The court noted that "[t]he
targets of the search were those places where Gossmeyer would likely store
the alleged pornographic pictures.' 72 Because the search "did not extend
to places where the pictures would not reasonably have been found,"' 173 the
court found it to be permissible in scope.
B. Searches for Evidence of Criminal Violations
In O'Connor, the Supreme Court specifically declined to address the
appropriate standard for searches when an employee is being investigated
for criminal misconduct that does not violate some workforce policy.
74
While not addressing the issue directly, the Court did comment on the
distinction between criminal investigations and investigations into work-
related misconduct: "While police, and even administrative enforcement
personnel, conduct searches for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence
for use in criminal or other enforcement proceedings, employers most
frequently need to enter the offices and desks of their employees for
legitimate work-related reasons wholly unrelated to the illegal conduct.',
75
Several lower courts have addressed the standard required for searches
conducted solely for the purpose of obtaining criminal evidence, and found
that "Itihe rationale for the lesser burden O'Connor places on public
employers is not applicable for [public employers] engaged in a criminal
170. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 401 (4th Cir. 2000).
171. Id.
172. Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 491(7th Cir. 1997).
173. Id.
174. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 723:
Because the parties in this case have alleged that the search was either a
noninvestigatory work-related intrusion or an investigatory search for evidence
of suspected work-related employee misfeasance, we undertake to determine the
appropriate Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness only for these two
types of employer intrusions and leave for another day inquiry into other
circumstances.
175. Id. at 721.
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investigation."'' 76 Thus, a public employer "cannot cloak itself in its public
employer robes in order to avoid the probable cause requirement when it is
acquiring evidence for a criminal prosecution."'' 77  Where the sole
motivation behind a workplace search is to uncover evidence of criminal
wrongdoing, the appropriate standard is probable cause. 1
71
Of course, "[t]he line between a legitimate work-related search and an
illegitimate search for criminal evidence is clear in theory, but often blurry
in fact.', 179  This is especially true in situations where the personnel
conducting the search are members of an agency or department that is
undeniably "in the business of investigating the violation of the criminal
laws, '' 8 which is a critical distinction from the situation presented to the
Court in O'Connor. However, the mere involvement of law enforcement
personnel will not automatically convert a work-related search into a
criminal investigation.' 8' In such situations, "the crucial question is not
whether the investigation involves actions arising out of a [public
employee's] duties, but whether the investigation's objective is to
discipline the [employee] within the department or to seek criminal
prosecution."' 8 2  Stated differently, "in looking to ascertain whether the
investigation is criminal in nature, the proper focus is not on the positions
or capabilities of the persons conducting the search, but rather the reason
for the search itself."' 83 Among the factors considered by courts in making
176. United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 675 (9th Cir. 1991).
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002) ("The
O'Connor standard is not applicable to federal agents engaged in a criminal investigation.").
179. SEARCHING AND SEIZING, supra note 37, at 35.
180. O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 722.
181. United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 679 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting several federal
circuit courts of appeal have upheld "searches by law enforcement personnel into work-
related misconduct.., under the O'Connor standard.").
182. Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 200 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Lowe v. City of
Macon, 720 F. Supp. 994, 998 (M.D. Ga. 1989), aff'd without opinion, 925 F.2d 1475 (11 th
Cir. 1991) ("It is the purpose behind the search which is controlling as to which standard,
probable cause, or reasonable suspicion will be applied.").
183. Wiley v. Dep't of Justice 328 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also United
States v. Femandes, 272 F.3d 938, 943 n.3 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating search ordered by
prosecutor should be analyzed under O'Connor standard because it was not ordered as part
of a criminal investigation, but rather was necessary to "'ensure that the work of the agency
[was] conducted in a proper and efficient manner' (alteration in original)); Gossmeyer v.
McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 492 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that presence of OIG investigators
during work-related misconduct search did not transform search into unlawful criminal
investigation); Shields v. Burge, 874 F.2d 1201 (7th Cir. 1989) (analyzing search by internal
affairs investigators under O'Connor, even though parallel criminal investigation was being
conducted). But see Rossi v. Town of Pelham, 35 F. Supp. 2d 58, 65 (D.N.H. 1997) (stating
that O'Connor exception was inapplicable where police officer searched town official's
office; court noted "[t]he status of the searcher, whether police officer or supervisor, bears
on the constitutional reasonableness of a warrantless search of a public employee's private
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this determination include whether a criminal investigation has been
opened, whether a workforce policy was violated, and the position of the
individual who conducted the search.
For example, in United States v. Hagarty,184 the defendant, a criminal
investigator for the Internal Revenue Service, had been convicted of
perjury based upon evidence gleaned from a listening device secretly
installed without a warrant in another government employee's office as part
of a separate investigation. Hagarty appealed his conviction, claiming that
the evidence obtained from the eavesdropping device violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. In response, the government asserted, among other
things, "that the Fourth Amendment [did] not apply to the search of
government premises in the course of an investigation relating to the
conduct of governmental business."' 185  The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rejected the government's argument. The court noted the
eavesdropping was not intended to "supervise and investigate" Hagarty's
duties, but "was designed to detect [the] criminal activity" of another
employee. 8 6 Further, this was not a search "for 'official property needed
for official use' or for anything belonging to the Government. ' 17 Instead,
"this eavesdropping was part of an effort to secure evidence of crime," and
was 'precisely the kind of search by policemen.., against which the
constitutional prohibition was directed."' 88  Consequently, the evidence
obtained from the eavesdropping device was obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Likewise, in United States v. Kahan,189 the defendant worked for the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Suspecting that Kahan was
violating federal law, a criminal investigation was begun. As part of that
investigation, daily searches of a wastebasket in Kahan's office were
conducted, resulting in various pieces of evidence being recovered. None
of these searches were made pursuant to a warrant. At his trial, Kahan
claimed the evidence had been seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. The court agreed. Here, a supervisor or employee was not
"looking for some needed document or record and inadvertently [happen]
upon incriminating evidence in the desk or wastebasket of another
employee." ' 90 Further, this was not a situation "where a supervisor [was]
office.").
184. 388 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1968).
185. Id. at 717.
186. Id. at717.
187. Id. at718.
188. Id. at 718 (quoting United States v. Blok, 188 F.2d 1019, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 1951)).
189. 350 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), rev'd in part on other grounds, 479 F.2d 290
(2d Cir. 1973), rev'd with directions to reinstate the district court judgment, 415 U.S. 239
(1974).
190. Id. at 791.
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inspecting the area used by a subordinate in order to examine his work or to
evaluate his performance on the job.' ' 9 1 Instead, this was a "specifically
focused investigation of the suspected criminal activities of an employee in
the course of his employment .... ,192 In such cases,
[T]he supervisor's role is no longer that of a manager of an
office, but that of a criminal investigator for the government. The
purpose of the supervisor's surveillance is no longer simply to
preserve efficiency in the office. It is specifically designed to
prepare a criminal prosecution against the employee. In that
case, searches and seizures by the supervisor or by other
government agents are governed by the Fourth Amendment
admonition that a warrant be obtained in the absence of exigent
circumstances. 193
C. Dual-Purpose Searches
While the standards set out above appear relatively clear, there are
often situations in which a government employee's misconduct might well
have a criminal dimension to it, thereby falling into both the work-related
misconduct and criminal violation categories. For example, a government
employee may be receiving and downloading child pornography from a
government computer. While clearly criminal in nature, this conduct also
could (and most likely does) constitute a violation of workforce policy
rules on appropriate government computer/Internet usage. In such a
situation, a public employer really has two purposes in conducting a search:
(1) to uncover evidence of the administrative violation, and (2) to uncover
potential criminal evidence. The question then becomes obvious: When a
government supervisor receives information that an activity is occurring
that violates both workforce regulations and criminal statutes, what
standard must be followed when searching the employee's workspace?
Because of the work-related misconduct that is occurring, will the lesser
standard of O'Connor suffice? Or, because of the criminal nature of the
allegations, must the traditional probable cause and warrant requirements
be met? "The courts have adopted fairly generous interpretations of
O'Connor when confronted with mixed-motive searches.'
194
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 678 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding O'Connor
standard applicable where misconduct investigation had criminal elements, because
"O'Connor's goal of ensuring an efficient workplace should not be frustrated simply
because the same misconduct that violates a government employer's policy also happens to
be illegal."); SEARCHING AND SEIZING, supra note 37, at 35.
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As an example, we can once more look to the Simons case for
guidance. The court upheld the search of the Simons' office using the
"reasonableness" standard set out in O'Connor. More importantly, the
court noted they were doing so, even "assum[ing] that the dominant
purpose of the warrantless search... was to acquire evidence of criminal
activity."
' 195
Nevertheless, the search remains within the O'Connor exception
to the warrant requirement; FBIS did not lose its special need for
"the efficient and proper operation of the workplace," merely
because the evidence obtained was evidence of a crime. Simons'
violation of FBIS' Internet policy happened alsQ to be a violation
of criminal law; this does not mean that FBIS lost the capacity
and interests of an employer.
1 96
Similarly, in United States v. Reilly,197 the defendant was accessing
child pornography from his government computer, a clear violation of both
the Department of Labor's computer use policy and federal statutes.
During a search of his cubicle, two diskettes were seized from the
defendant, both of which were later found to contain child pornography.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress both diskettes, claiming the
warrantless search and seizure violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The
defendant claimed the seizure of the diskettes was not truly part of an
investigation into work-related misconduct, because the agency was aware
of his administrative violations prior to the seizure of the diskettes and
could have taken action against him without seizing them. The defendant
argued the search was actually made for the sole purpose of uncovering
evidence of criminal violations, which would require probable cause and a
warrant. In denying his motion to suppress, the District Court held the
search of the diskettes fell within O'Connor's "work-related misconduct"
exception. "Agent Wager's dual role as an investigator of workplace
misfeasance and criminal activity does not invalidate the otherwise
legitimate workplace search.
1 98
IV. SUMMARY
A search of a government employee's workplace must comply with
the Fourth Amendment. In addressing these situations, a two-part analysis
can be used. First, it must be determined whether the employee had a
195. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2000).
196. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
197. 01 Cr. 1114 (RPP), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9865, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2002).
198. Id. at*15-16.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. In making this
determination, factors relied upon by courts include whether prior notice
was provided to the employee; common practices of the agency; the
openness and accessibility of the area; the position of, the employee; and
whether the employee waived his expectation of privacy. If the employee
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched, the
Fourth Amendment is not implicated. If a reasonable expectation of
privacy does exist, then the purpose behind the search must be analyzed. A
search for work-related purposes (either non-investigatory or for work-
related misconduct) must be reasonable based on the totality of the
circumstances. To qualify as reasonable, the search must be (1) justified at
its inception and (2) permissible in scope. If the search is made solely to
uncover evidence of criminal misconduct, then probable cause and a search
warrant are required, unless an exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment exists (e.g., consent). In situations where the search is
conducted for dual purposes, courts have been fairly generous in finding
that the "special needs" rules announced in O'Connor apply.
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